103

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA

Y 4.F 76/1:C 14/6/944

Recent Developments in Cambodia, 10...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 11, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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CONTENTS

WITNESSES

	Page
Peter Tomsen, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State	2
Hon. Margaret Carpenter, Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East, Agency for International Development	4

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:	
Peter Tomsen	21
Hon. Margaret Carpenter	31
Cambodian Mission for Peace, supplementary testimony	37

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA

WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:15 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

When the subcommittee met last October to discuss Cambodia in the wake of successful elections and a newly established government, events there gave cause for both optimism and pessimism.

For optimists, there were free and fair elections, the relatively successful integration of various armed factions into the government's army, the solid beginning of the relationship between the Ranarridh and Hun Sen, and the successful role played by UNTAC.

Pessimists pointed to the continued resistance of the Khmer Rouge, the questionable degree of success in integrating the armed factions into the Army, whether the solid relationship between Ranarridh and Hun Sen would be sustained, and that the withdrawal of UNTAC would remove the glue that held Cambodia together.

Recent events in Cambodia would lead one to believe that the pessimists may have been right. Fighting between government forces and the Khmer Rouge, despite initial government success, has taken a turn for the worse. Press reports indicate that the Khmer Rouge have retained their bases at Anlong Veng and Pailin—did I get that right?—Pailin, that is even better—and have pushed close to the provincial capital. Arguably, the Khmer Rouge still controls a large portion of the Cambodian countryside.

At best, the recent setbacks are only a temporary stumble along the road to reconstruction. At worst, the Khmer Rouge could again plunge Cambodia into full-scale civil war with all of its attendant chaos.

With us today to discuss the situation as well as the government's policy toward Cambodia, are Margaret Carpenter, Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East, Agency for International Development, and Peter Tomsen, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, of the Department of State.

Before we begin, I would like to congratulate Charlie Twining on an outstanding confirmation hearing before our Senate counterpart. I can certainly tell that his reputation as a gentleman and a

diplomat are unparalleled. And my staff informs me that Ambassador Twining and the embassy are doing an outstanding job in difficult and dangerous conditions. And I hope to have a chance to meet Ambassador Twining in the very near future.

Welcome to our panel.

Without objection our ranking minority member, Mr. Leach, will have his statement, his opening statement, inserted in the record.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: The prepared statement will not be a part of the printed hearing record.]

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I take a special interest in Cambodia, as you are well aware. And I am very concerned about what has been going on in the last few months in particular. There are two areas I am concerned about and we will go over this during questioning.

Number one, I am concerned about the inaction on the part of our own government toward moving rapidly into a position where with very low cost we could have provided things that would have supported the Cambodian Democratic reform and bolstered the results of the election process. I don't think the administration moved quickly enough in the area of Most-Favored-Nation status and those types of arrangements, economic arrangements which could have provided the resources necessary for the Cambodian Government to get through this period of transition.

Instead, which is the second thing I am concerned about, the Cambodian Government faces a major challenge with the Khmer Rouge. And it seems the Khmer Rouge have retained areas of the country which those of us who visited the country thought that that was not possible; that the tide of history was going in the other direction.

And, Mr. Chairman, those concern me and I appreciate you very much calling this hearing to make sure that we focus on an area of the world that has been forgotten by far too many people in power and decisionmakers.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much for your opening statement.

The chair would like to acknowledge the presence of some very distinguished visitors that are joining us today to witness as much of this hearing as they would like. We have Chairman Chu and a delegation from the People's Republic of China. Chairman Chu is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the People's Republic of China. And it is a whole new world out there. We welcome you to our open hearing. We look forward to reciprocating.

Why do we not just begin right now? Do you have a selected order of preference?

STATEMENT OF PETER TOMSEN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you do not mind, I will go first. I have a statement. I am afraid it is a rather long, so I will just read excerpts.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Fine. Pull the microphone a little bit closer to you.

Mr. TOMSEN. How is this?

Mr. ACKERMAN. A little better.

Mr. TOMSEN. Should I throw away my statement?

As we approach the first anniversary of the dramatically successful unorganized elections in Cambodia, held from May 23 to 28, 1993, the events of recent weeks have demonstrated that the future of democracy in Cambodia cannot be taken for granted. The recapture of Pailin by the Khmer Rouge and their success in reestablishing illegal control over certain areas in western Cambodia have been setbacks to the royal Cambodian Government. While this does not threaten the viability of the government, it underscores the danger that the Khmer Rouge still poses to Cambodia's emerging democracy.

The government has been working to develop governmental institutions and has made significant strides in governing and advancing respect for human rights and implementing market-oriented economic reforms. Cooperation between FUNCINPEC and the CPP has surpassed earlier predictions, although there are still tensions within the ruling coalition as these former adversaries work out the dynamics of sharing power.

In the economic area, Cambodia has made important strides, including steps to liberalize trade, improve revenue collection, create macroeconomic stability, reduce inflation and stabilize exchange rates. Cambodia's well-received national rehabilitation and development program outline sound priorities, including reforming administrative and judicial institutions, promoting economic stabilization and growth, ensuring structural adjustment in sectoral reform, providing direct support for sustained development, and optimizing the sustainable utilization of the natural resource base.

Despite its successes, Cambodia still faces enormous development, humanitarian and security challenges. Cambodia remains one of the world's least developed countries. Its infrastructure has been devastated, the result of more than 20 years of war and Khmer Rouge atrocities. Cambodia lacks the institutions and adequate numbers of trained personnel needed for a mature democracy.

Under these challenging circumstances, it is vital that we, the United States and the international community, join the royal Cambodian Government and the Cambodian people in doing all we can to ensure the success of Cambodian democracy.

As the first anniversary of Cambodia's rebirth as a democratic nation draws near, it is more important than ever that the United States and its partners remain engaged to ensure the progress the Cambodians and the international community have worked so hard to achieve is sustained. We are doing our part, as I will get into later.

With their courage and determination, the Cambodian people have moved a long-distance from the killing fields of only a few years ago. They have shown that the yearning for freedom is a universal impulse, not a Western export. No other people have suffered more or earned our admiration more. The international community and America must not let them down.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my formal remarks. However, before moving on to Margaret, I wonder if I could mention that we

have received a good bit of news from Cambodia this morning. The American NGO relief worker, Melissa Himes, who was abducted by the Khmer Rouge in March, has been released after strenuous efforts by the Cambodian Government, our American Embassy, Charlie Twining and others.

The reports we have received indicate she is safe and sound and in good health. Thank you.

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is good news.

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tomsen appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ms. Carpenter.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARGARET CARPENTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Ms. CARPENTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rohrabacher. I welcome this opportunity to discuss the role of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the international effort to support Cambodia's emerging democracy, and I would also like to submit my statement for the record and summarize my remarks.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without objection, both statements in their entirety will be placed in the record.

Ms. CARPENTER. Thank you.

Cambodia's recent transformation is a truly encouraging success story and we can be very proud of the role that U.S. assistance has played. This story has had its difficult chapters and it is by no means over. Indeed, the political situation remains very fragile, but the Cambodians have nevertheless passed some important benchmarks in the last year and today they offer hope to other peoples burdened with reconstruction and transformation.

Just a year ago, prospects for democracy in Cambodia seemed shaky at best. Despite the largest U.N. peacekeeping and assistance operation ever assembled, Cambodia's infrastructure and economy were still in shambles. Key generations lacked the training or experience to build new institutions and democracy and elections were mysterious concepts to Cambodia's largely young and uneducated population. Perhaps most troubling, the Khmer Rouge returned to violence and threatened to disrupt the elections on which the political transformation was to be based.

But the elections last May, the country's first free and fair elections ever, marked a triumph of ordinary Cambodians who dared to express their desire for a voice in their future. Over 90 percent of eligible voters braved Khmer Rouge threats to cast ballots for a Constituent Assembly. Last summer the Constituent Assembly wrote and ratified a democratic constitution; and in September, Norodom Sihanouk, the new constitutional monarch, returned from exile to inaugurate the Royal Cambodian Government.

Despite much progress since September, the Royal Cambodian Government is still a very fragile coalition marked by political infighting. The parties that make it up are not well developed as institutions and they do not necessarily function in predictable ways. There are a lot of other problems that Cambodia faces now, includ-

ing disarray in certain parts of it army; the Khmer Rouge is threatening its control, corruption is widespread and this is combined with an extremely low capacity of the government to govern. All of these factors increase the threat of destabilization. However, the government has held on during a very difficult period and seems to be developing the capacity to continue.

Some of the important benchmarks in the last year include the donors' conference last March, which took place in Tokyo. The government reaffirmed its commitment to democratic principles and progress toward a market economy at that conference. It also pledged to reform administrative and judicial institutions, promote economic stabilization and growth, support structural adjustments and sectoral reform and work for sustainable use of natural resources.

In response to appeals from the Cambodians and the World Bank at that conference, the donor community pledged a total of $773 million for the next 2 years. This brings the total international effort since 1992 to $1.8 billion, apart from the U.N.'s efforts. The United States has been one of the most active and important donors in assisting Cambodia's drive for reconstruction and democratization.

USAID program of development assistance to Cambodia is built around four core concerns: the first is strengthening democratic institutions. USAID is helping to develop both the public and private institutions that are crucial for the growth of Cambodian democracy. Through the Asia Foundation, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Asian-American Free Labor Institute, and the U.N., USAID has provided training for political parties both before and after the May 1993 elections.

We have provided advice to the new Constituent Assembly during the—I am sorry to the Constituent Assembly during the drafting period for the new constitution. We have provided training of public defenders in the criminal justice system. We have provided assistance for the secretariat and the commissions of the new National Assembly, and finally, training of Cambodian nongovernmental organizations involved in human rights work.

The second core concern is promoting economic growth. With USAID help, the Cambodian Government is the developing the ability to manage the transition from a centrally controlled economy to a free market economy. USAID will provide technical advisers to the government in the areas of macroeconomic planning, including fiscal and monetary policy, management of donor resources and overall development strategy.

With USAID help, the new government has already produced a widely accepted strategy paper on coordination with donors and international organizations. In addition, we are supporting faculty training and curriculum design at the Phonm Penh Institute of Economic Science.

The next area of concern is building infrastructure. Here we are helping to demine and repair major roads and highways in Cambodia. During the period of U.N. peacekeeping, USAID facilitated the U.N.-supervised return of 360,000 refugees from the Thai-Cambodian border by rebuilding over 500 kilometers of rural roads in the northwest parts of the country. USAID work stimulated the

rural economy and enabled the delivery of basic social services in the area.

In the near future, USAID will begin the rebuilding of Route 4, which is the national highway connecting Phnom Penh with Cambodia's sole deep-water port of Sihanoukville. Route 4 is key to the entire Cambodian economy, since the only shipping alternative to Sihanoukville is transit along the Mekong River through Vietnam.

The next area of concern is improving humanitarian services. USAID is helping to improve the health and economic welfare of vulnerable groups such as children, orphans, war victims and widows. We are working with over 30 U.S. and Cambodian private voluntary organizations in the area of community development, health education, primary health care, birth spacing, sanitation, prosthetics, vocational training and literacy.

For example, we are helping to support World Vision's staff training at the National Pediatric Hospital, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation prosthetics and wheelchair clinic, and World Relief's community development banks for poor mothers. USAID also manages a volunteer program that sends young Cambodian Americans back to their homeland to provide English language instruction and other forms of technical assistance.

One area of USAID-supported activity that deserves particularly note is demining. Land mines which may number up to 10 million cause 300 casualties a month and present a serious obstacle to Cambodia's development efforts. U.S. Government has been the major donor for demining in Cambodia with total pledges of $12 million since 1992. One of the goals of the U.S. Government's demining assistance is to develop Cambodia's own capacity to conduct this critical work which will certainly have to continue for years to come.

Given Cambodia's progress over the past few years, USAID's assistance program evolved from support for humanitarian services and emergency support for the U.N.-supervised peace process toward assistance for the Cambodian Government's comprehensive national development program. Currently, we are developing a medium-term assistance strategy for Cambodia that will guide our work through 1997. Recognizing that significant needs still challenge the Cambodian Government's capacity and resources, the new strategy focuses on the need to promote political stability and democratic pluralism, support sustainable economic growth and meet humanitarian needs.

Activities designed to meet these goals include democratic initiatives for better govern maintenance, particularly the legal, regulatory and judicial systems, and stronger political institutions including political parties and unions; technical and policy support to improve the analytic and policymaking capability of government ministries; repair of roads; cofinancing of PVO activities, including follow-on PVO project after the completion of existing activities; new family health and child spacing programs for better reproductive health; training and materials for all 46,000 teachers in the country and for the Institute of Public Administration; and finally environmental planning.

Rebuilding a nation that has seen as much trauma as Cambodia demands persistence, hard work and often outside help. The Cam-

bodian killing fields have not been miraculously transformed into a democratic utopia. In fact, the Khmer Rouge is still a threat to the certain parts of Cambodia. But for most of the population, hope has replaced despair and the framework for self-governance is in place for the nation as a whole. International support has been crucial in making this transformation possible, but much remains to be done. The donor community must continue to support the Cambodian people in their courageous efforts to transcend the tragedy of a painful history.

That concludes my remarks.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Carpenter appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. Thank both of you. Let me start with a couple of questions.

Is the level of the conflict currently at a stage where it could threaten the stability of the government?

Mr. TOMSEN. The answer to that is no, it is not at that level. The viability of the government is not threatened.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Can the government defeat the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. TOMSEN. Over time, yes.

Do you want me to elaborate on that? Let me elaborate on that.

The Khmer Rouge, according to our assessments, is in a long-term decline. It goes in little cycles, but the inevitable direction is downwards, Mr. Chairman.

The Khmer Rouge began to lose ground when the Vietnamese pulled out and especially after the freely elected government assumed power in Phonm Penh, because its raison d'etre in the main was that they were standing up against the Vietnamese; they were standing up for Cambodian nationalism.

But there are other reasons for the decline. One is its Maoist ideology, which it still adheres to, which does not have many takers in Cambodia; a general wariness in the population; they want to see an end to the fighting, and the end to Chinese and Thai weaponry supplies.

All of these developments over the last several years have precipitated this decline. We anticipate that the decline will continue. It will become increasingly less of a military threat.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Other than the military, what do you see as other options?

Mr. TOMSEN. In terms of——

Mr. ACKERMAN. A conflict with the Khmer Rouge.

Mr. TOMSEN. The other day, a very high ranking Khmer official in talking to our National War College group that was visiting in Phonm Penh said that we do not need piles of weapons. I am sure he did not mean we do not need military help, but he said we do not need enormous amounts of—that was his implication—of weaponry. What we need is development. If we can build institutions, if we can develop our economy, then the Khmer Rouge will go away like the Communist insurgencies went away in Thailand and Malaysia in the 1950's and 1960's.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let us turn to that for a second and maybe, Ms. Carpenter, you can help us. Since the last hearing, has there been any progress on developing the rural road system and has AID played a role in that?

Ms. CARPENTER. Yes, there has been a great deal of progress. In fact, the first phase is complete and we are about to begin the second phase, which includes working on the main road between the capital of Phonm Penh and the port at Sihanoukville.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is that route known as Route 4?

Ms. CARPENTER. Yes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Faleomavaega, you have not made an opening statement. Would you like to make one?

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I defer to the distinguished gentleman from California since he was here before me.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Such camaraderie.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Did I not hear before that the military threat from the Khmer Rouge was easing and now all of a sudden we have a Khmer Rouge expansion?

Mr. TOMSEN. The expansion took place just in the last, say, couple of months, but before that, during the dry season, the government had done what no other regime had done before, after the Vietnamese pulled out, they rolled up to the border and took the main Khmer Rouge headquarters, Pailin and Anlong Veng, as the chairman mentioned. So what you saw was an inability to hold those places. The Khmer Rouge were able to come back and take them again and go a little further, but basically it is the same situation as it was when the government started its ground offensive last——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, please excuse me if I am incorrect in this, but in this battle site Pailin——

Mr. TOMSEN. Pailin, yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Which is right on the border.

Mr. TOMSEN. Near the border, yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There were reports that artillery shells were coming, Khmer Rouge artillery shells were coming from the Thai side of the border; is that right?

Mr. TOMSEN. It is out of artillery reach. I would have to check this, but I believe it is far enough away from the border——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We can assume perhaps the artillery shells that were then brought to the canons and put into the canons were coming from someplace in Thailand, can we not?

Mr. TOMSEN. Actually, the reports we got on how it was retaken was by infantry; that they very easily came into Pailin because the government defenses were not being attended to, which has been brought up by the Royal Cambodian Government officials to us in throwing up their hands in frustration over the government's military at Pailin.

They were not ready. After they took the place, many of them engaged in trying to pick up something extra on the side, including rubies, that is the site of the gem market, and it was mainly a couple hundred troops walking in and retaking it.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us talk about the competence first and then we will talk about Thai support.

Does the United States have any plans whatsoever to try to help mold the new army that is being built with the new government in Cambodia? Are we helping them?

Mr. TOMSEN. We would certainly have an interest in seeing that, very much so.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But we do not have anybody now.

Mr. TOMSEN. We do not have any military program in terms especially of lethal assistance, but we have 11 programs in the nonlethal area that are going forward. Like for instance within the last 2 months we started a Khmer Rouge defection program in which we used excess DOD supplies like we do in Afghanistan. We have moved in $1 million worth of medical supplies and other equipment to give to Khmer Rouge defectors.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think the touchy-feely stuff works with some groups and some groups it does not. Frankly, the Khmer Rouge, even though—from what I have read, the Khmer Rouge now is this new generation of Khmer Rouge, et cetera, and they are not the same old guys, but it seems to me they are not going to be affected by the positive incentives, let's say, as compared to somebody who is facing a well-disciplined military force.

Is it not justified now that they have gone through their democratic transition and that certainly the old Government of Cambodia has proven that they really are trying to set up a new, more democratic society? Would not a military helping them build their new military, would that not be justified now?

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes. It is mostly a question of how to do it. Everything that has been accomplished since the Paris Accords has been multilateral. It has not been the United States going in there ourselves. And in the military area, as you know, this is especially sensitive. We are consulting and have been consulting with our allies and friends who have been involved with us.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Why is it especially sensitive? Who the heck cares except the people who are exploiting Cambodia? Wouldn't be highly sensitive to Singapore? The Vietnamese probably would like it. They do not want the Khmer Rouge back in. What is highly sensitive? What do we have to worry about?

Mr. TOMSEN. I will give you one example. Very recently the Thai Foreign Minister, Mr. Prasong, made a statement that it would not be good if anybody in the international community gave military assistance to the Royal Cambodian Government. Of course, we will make our own decisions, but I am just giving you one example. There are other countries, too, that would rather, if anything goes forward in this area, that it be multilateral and not by the United States unilaterally.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I would submit, this is rather than just a question here, I would submit that this commitment to multilateralism by this administration is going to lead us to exactly the situations like this, where we cannot do anything. And a year from now we will be in the same spot if we wait for everything else to make decisions.

I would just submit that if there is any country in the world where governments have reached out and tried to do the right thing and are working under severe handicaps, that this is a government that deserves the United States to make a commitment at least to help them rebuild their military forces, because they will keep losing these battles with these guerrillas as long as there is not a disciplined military force facing them. What they do not have now is a professional army, which then leads into the Thai question, which was your basic answer.

When I was there last there was—which was in December, I could not help but notice in the newspapers that five huge warehouses of supplies had been discovered in Thailand and they believed that they were Khmer Rouge supply depots. We are not going to really let the Thais tell us that we cannot help the democratically elected Government of Cambodia, help them rebuild their military when they are permitting this heinous military force to store their weapons on the border in Thailand, are we?

Mr. TOMSEN. No, but when you asked for reasons why we should proceed multilaterally, I gave that as one example. There are others, too. I also think in Congress we would have to consult closely before we went down a lethal assistance road for the Cambodian Government. Not to mention those that have been in Cambodia with us through this terrifically successful experiment——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, if the Khmer Rouge were basically trying to regain power by setting up schools and aid stations in competition to the Cambodian Government, I think we would be successful. But I think the Khmer Rouge are mainly focused on using brute force to obtain power, which is what they were—and, by the way, the Thais, I think, have been very generous. They did keep hundreds of thousands of refugees from Cambodia in Thailand, but that does not mean that when we have a disagreement like this we should not be very frank.

Our Chinese friends who are here watching today, I understand that they no longer are supporting the Khmer Rouge and they should be applauded for that, and the Thais should certainly be made to know that we are aware that they are continuing to do this and that we do not approve of that.

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes, the Thai also supported the peace process. They were a key part of it. And the Thai have been assisting the Royal Cambodian Government, as well. They have sent road building equipment, they have sent military uniforms to the Cambodian regime.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They have sent road building equipment—and this is my last question, Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me—the road building equipment is an interesting question, because I noted in your remarks, Ms. Carpenter, that they just completed this road project in the northwestern part of the country. Am I missing something here in that isn't the northwest part of the country the part of the country that is dominated by the Khmer Rouge?

Ms. CARPENTER. No, the area where the road repair was taking place was along the Thai border where the refugees were being brought back into Cambodia. There are pockets of Khmer Rouge to the south and the north of this area where the roads were being repaired. But our road repair was primarily in the area where the refugees were returning from Thailand.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You do not think if I went back there and looked at those road projects that I might find trees being taken from Cambodia to Thailand, and gems being taken from Cambodia to Thailand, and other savaging of the natural resources being transported on roads that we have built?

Ms. CARPENTER. There certainly are a lot of reports of that happening in the areas that the Khmer Rouge control. Whether or not

the roads have been improved, that does not seem to stop them. We are concerned about the Khmer Rouge control of any part of Cambodia, and we would hope that over the long run the government would be able to push back the Khmer Rouge.

At the time we did the road building, it was essential to the return of those refugees and that was part of the process that led up to the elections.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Part of the deal with the Thais, we improved the roads.

Ms. CARPENTER. This was part of a U.N.-combined effort to bring the refugees back. It was essential to their return. We also saw it as important to the future development of the Cambodian economy, because it opened up a lot of areas to people who did not otherwise have access to markets.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But you get what I am worried about.

Ms. CARPENTER. I understand.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We end up building roads and that country right now is being raped and it is not by the Thai Government, it is by people who are outside the Thai Government whether the Thai Government have not come down on hard and have not been willing to take the political heat to cut them off, but they are absolutely savaging that country the same way they are doing it in Burma.

Ms. CARPENTER. We are worried about reports of that. The road project, however, has multiple purposes and it is very important to the provision of social services and to the development of the rural economy.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I do remember in "The Ugly American" had something to do with the road project, so I just thought we should pay attention to that.

Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Let me just follow up, if I may, before my colleague from American Samoa, who I know has some questions.

The official policy of the Thais, is that to cooperate with the Khmer Rouge? Have they gotten better? Have they gotten worse? And, indeed, how did the knowledge of those five warehouses come to the public's attention?

Mr. TOMSEN. The official policy of Thailand is to support the peace process and the government that was elected because of it, in which Thailand participated in.

Thailand annunciates a policy of nonsupport to the Khmer Rouge. However, we, like Congressman Rohrabacher, and I am sure others, including yourself, Mr. Chairman, are concerned about continuing reports and indications that elements of the Thai military are somehow engaged even now with the Khmer Rouge.

Dana mentioned the warehouses in Chanthaburi. Those were discovered by Thai police. We have asked for an explanation and we have repeated our request, but we still have not gotten——

Mr. ACKERMAN. There is a distinction between the police and the military in Thailand?

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes. This was discovered by the police. And these were warehouses of arms. And we just got a report, we have just

seen a report more recently of another small warehouse, so we continue to have these indications.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is the suspicion that the military knew about it and looked the other way and the police discovered it?

Mr. TOMSEN. First of all, I would say yes, but it is suspicions of elements in the military. Because we believe that the—that there are different groups within the military who still carry on such relations with the Khmer Rouge.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, just to follow up on your question to Mr. Tomsen.

Would you say, Mr. Tomsen, that the military element involved in this relationship with the Khmer Rouge, their involvement is primarily economic and not political or do you have any information to their involvement here with the Khmer Rouge as you have stated earlier?

Mr. TOMSEN. Sir, I believe we would have to go into a closed hearing because then we would be getting into intelligence matters to answer that question.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You stated earlier that military elements are involved here. I wanted a clarification. If it is a military element or factions within the Thai armed forces that they are really for personal economic interest and not because they believe in what the Khmer Rouge is doing. That is what I want to ask you to elaborate on this. In other words, just trying to make money out of it.

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes, but, again, to speak definitively on why this is going on, how it is going on, it is classified information. But this is something that has been in the press that has been discussed and——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Would you state officially that the People's Republic of China have severed all official relationship with the Khmer Rouge at this point in time?

Mr. TOMSEN. The People's Republic of China has stated they have stopped all lethal assistance to all factions. They will not send any more lethal assistance. We do not——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Legal assistance?

Mr. TOMSEN. Lethal.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Lethal.

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes, lethal. And we do not have any indications they have broken that pledge.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. When you say "lethal," these are Howitzers, tanks?

Mr. TOMSEN. Anything that can kill.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. How about AK–47s?

Mr. TOMSEN. That would be included. Anything that can kill would be described as lethal assistance.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. How long has this commitment been on the books, so to speak?

Has this been for 1 year now or is this something that just happened recently?

Mr. TOMSEN. I would have to collect that, sir. It was certainly before the elections and I don't know how far back before that. But we will get back to you with an answer.[1]

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Where is the primary—I mean the primary source of the Khmer Rouge—I am concerned about this—for the weaponry system they are now able to fight the way they are doing now in Cambodia. Who is the primary source of their weaponry system?

Mr. TOMSEN. They just captured 10 tanks at Pailin and some other equipment. To a certain extent, it would be the government-captured weapons. But when they lost the Chinese and Thai military supplies, as I mentioned, it was a major factor in weakening their position. We think there are under 9,000 combatants now. They are basically up there in that northern thin line along the border, northwest and some pockets in the Southwest, and there are not many of them and they do not have that many weapons now.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What would you attribute to the Khmer Rouge's success in recent events? Their military ability to be successful where they are at now? Do they have better generals than the Cambodian Army or——

Mr. TOMSEN. I think it is the preparedness of the Cambodian Army. One sort of advantage that came out from the Pailin recapture, one useful outcome, is that these weaknesses in the Cambodian Army were portrayed very clearly from ghost soldiers, which might be a third of the declared forces, to command and control structure, to logistics, to lack of food. All of these weaknesses were revealed in that setback.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is Mr. Pol Pot in any way involved in this recent—with the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. TOMSEN. We would assume so.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I have asked this question previously to Secretary Lord, and somehow I am still puzzled by all this, and maybe you could help me, Mr. Secretary. You know, we jumped on the genocide acts that were done in Yugoslavia and bringing these people to some international court for violation of international law and genocide, and I have always been curious what is this administration's policy toward Pol Pot.

Seems to me he should be under the same type of classification; that he should be subject to some kind of an international tribune for what he has done.

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is the administration pursuing this effort in some way toward Pol Pot?

Mr. TOMSEN. I am sorry, I cannot answer that. Something was underway, but I just, I do not know the answer to that question, I am sorry.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you provide it for the record?

Mr. TOMSEN. I shall.

[The information follows:]

In response to this request, we wish to inform you that it is the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge, includ-

[1] EDITOR'S NOTE: The information will not be a part of the printed hearing record.

ing Pol Pot, for the crimes they have committed. The administration will be taking appropriate action, consistent with the provisions of the Cambodia Genocide Justice Act (H.R. 2333), to carry out this policy.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Let's be fair, if we are going to do it with one group, let's do it with this guy, because this guy gets away with it, and somehow I just have always been curious why our government has not pressed for Pol Pot to bring him to court for the kind of vicious acts, atrocities that this man has committed against the Cambodian people.

I am just puzzled by why we just have not been up front and forthright in pursuing this.

I just wanted to ask Ms. Carpenter, on the $1.8 billion that we have committed to Cambodia and AID, what percentage of that comes from Uncle Sam?

Ms. CARPENTER. That was not from AID. That is from the donor community as a whole.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All right. What percentage of that comes from us?

Ms. CARPENTER. I don't have the exact figures. I will have to get back to you.[2]

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What exactly—I am sorry, I did read your statement, but how much aid are we giving to Cambodia for fiscal year 1994?

Ms. CARPENTER. At the ICORC pledging conference in Tokyo in March we pledged over $29 million for this year and, in addition, the $3 million for demining; and for 1995, a total of $40 million. Obviously this would be subject to congressional approval, but this is an increase over what we had previously requested for this fiscal year.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You know, one of the pillars of the Clinton administration's foreign policy commitment now—at least it is my understanding, and please correct me if I am wrong—is that our foreign policy now is equated with our economic policy, whatever we are pursuing in terms of promoting exports and the like. And I just wanted to ask you, what is AID's funding now throughout Southeast Asia as part of our economic efforts in helping the countries of Southeast Asia? Do you have anything on a regional basis?

Because AID has recently gone through reorganization structurally, I just want you to comment on exactly—on a regional basis, if you feel that AID is doing a fantastic job on an evenhanded basis, that what you are doing for Africa, Southeast Asia, for Eastern Europe, and that everything is functioning in a very orderly manner. Can you comment on that?

Ms. CARPENTER. Let me take the first part of your question first. I think it is important to note that we have four strategic objectives in AID, not just promoting economic growth. They are, in addition to economic growth, supporting democratization and family planning and health and the environment.

In the case of Cambodia, our primary objectives are in supporting democracy, market economy, and health and family planning; and we are beginning to work in the environmental area as well.

[2] EDITOR'S NOTE: The information will not be a part of the printed hearing record.

AID is no longer as involved in some aspects of economic development as it was. There was a decision last year that AID would no longer be involved in U.S. trade promotion, U.S. investment overseas, so we are beginning to focus our activities much more on creating the economic climate in countries where we are working that will contribute to overall growth; and we hope in the process also to contribute to foreign investment, but it is not necessarily linked to trade promotion. There are a lot of other very compelling objectives.

In terms of the reorganization, we have combined the Asia and Near East bureaus as part of our reorganization. There are a couple of other bureaus that are being merged as well.

I think we are trying to look at the demands worldwide in a way that recognizes both developmental needs and U.S. interests; and obviously that is tough when the overall levels of foreign assistance are declining, so we have to make a lot of tough decisions, and frankly we agonize over the amount for every country, and it is a very difficult thing to meet the needs.

We have to look to better donor coordination with the rest of the international community to meet those needs, the United States is really not in a position to single-handedly respond to the needs that we find in every country. I think Cambodia is a very good example of where the international community has responded very well and will continue to do so.

The World Bank has just approved or is expected to approve a lending plan, the IMF has approved a plan, and the Asian Development Bank will also be providing substantial assistance to Cambodia in future years, so there is a combined effort here that I think will be very helpful in supporting the government.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Administrator, you really don't want me to believe that strengthening democratic institutions does not also strongly apply to our own economic interests as well? A strongly democratic country opens the free market and allows our exports to thrive in those democratic countries. You are saying that these economic points here have no basis for equating our foreign policy with economic interests, but I submit to you, madam, that I think they are all part of our economic interests.

Ms. CARPENTER. I didn't mean to imply that there wasn't some link. We believe very strongly that these goals are all interrelated. In this world, you can't separate out those things; but I think it is important to note in Cambodia that our primary interest is not creating an environment for U.S. investment, it is helping this government pull itself together to look forward to a day when it can sustain its own growth.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. While we are at it, what is the status of MFN for Cambodia?

Mr. TOMSEN. We have already had one round of talks with the Cambodians on a trade agreement, Mr. Chairman, and they went quite well. We gave them a draft trade agreement. Now we are waiting for their response. Once that is agreed to, then the MFN step takes place, but you have to have a trade agreement first.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is that the plan?

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes, that is the plan.

Mr. ACKERMAN. We get the trade agreement and proceed directly to granting of MFN.

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes, that is what we would hope to do.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Could you describe the overall human rights situation in Cambodia, specifically the treatment of ethnic Vietnamese and others?

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes. My staff has just put a note here that after the trade agreement we will have to consult with Congress, as well, before we move.

Mr. ACKERMAN. We knew that.

Mr. TOMSEN. We always consult with you. As a matter of fact, that is what we are doing now.

The human rights situation improved just dramatically after the elections. The constitution includes various human rights guarantees, many of which are in our Bill of Rights. Political prisoners were released after the elections, after the new government came in, Mr. Chairman.

Now, there is no——

Mr. ACKERMAN. All of the political prisoners?

Mr. TOMSEN. I was just going to say that there are no political prisoners left as far as we can see in government-held areas; but there are, of course, in Khmer Rouge-held areas.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Held by the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. TOMSEN. Held by the Khmer Rouge, yes, sir. There are independent radio stations and newspapers now that have sprung up and are giving their own positions in a multiparty system, and of course, there is a major effort under way in the government to create a new judiciary system. The Cambodians have to start from scratch.

But that also—this legal reform process is very important to democracy and human rights over the longer run, and AID is involved in that particular effort.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Could you tell us what the status of the U.N. force is in Cambodia? Is there a continued U.N. observer force? What is the strength of it, if there is?

Mr. TOMSEN. The approximately 16,000 peacekeeping troops involved in the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) departed from Cambodia by the time the UNTAC mandate expired on November 15, 1993, with the exception of a small number of logisticians who stayed to oversee removal of UNTAC equipment. A 20-person U.N. Military Liaison Team (UNMLT) was subsequently deployed for a 6-month period, to conclude May 15. After May 15, three U.N. military advisers, reporting to the Secretary General's Representative in Phnom Penh, will remain in Cambodia.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, just to use this opportunity—and you will correct me if I am wrong, I am sure.

Mr. ACKERMAN. You are never wrong.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think it is the consensus of members of this panel and this subcommittee, and I would imagine, as well, the committee as a whole that the administration should move forward as fast as possible in achieving Most-Favored-Nation status as well as establishing the economic ties and vehicles that are necessary

for this new fledgling democracy in Cambodia to succeed economically.

Doing that, to me, seems much—helping this country get to a point where it can make a profit and grow economically is much more important than providing it foreign aid, and Most-Favored-Nation status and some of the other economic vehicles that are necessary for progress have not been put in place yet, and so I just would like to go on the record strongly to suggest to the administration that rather than looking at it as an aid approach, we should be looking at this as an enterprise approach to this new democracy. That is number one.

Number two—this, I think, I am expressing just for myself. I really believe, as I stated earlier, it is time for us to help the Cambodian—this new Cambodian Government establish a professional military that will be able to cope with the challenges like the one that we face with the Khmer Rouge. We can't take it for granted that the trend line is good, thus we don't have to put this as a matter of concern. The trend line may be good with the Khmer Rouge, it could turn around tomorrow.

They need a professional military, and that is something within our power to do as well, although I think it is a little bit more complicated than the economic area.

One last question. Those were statements. One last question, Mr. Sihanouk, what is expected of Mr. Sihanouk? Is his health to the point where he is going to actually be able to fulfill his term of office? I know the question was asked earlier, but I want to be a little bit more specific on that.

Mr. TOMSEN. OK, I will just try to answer all these points. No country, as I am sure you are aware, has been more supportive of Cambodia than the United States. Since 1980, we have given $900 million of support to that war torn country, which is more by far than any other single country.

We gave—we have given since the Paris Conference——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Than any other single country has given?

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes, exactly. And we have given since UNTAC began, since the Paris Conference, $517 million, which I believe also—I might be wrong here, but I think it is more than any other country has given. We have also supported Cambodia through international organizations. The spigot is flowing; $120 million, the balance of payments, adjusted, has just been worked out between the IMF and the Cambodian Government.

The ADB is now negotiating a 3-year program of $266 million of development projects, and the World Bank is negotiating $60 million. We hope both of those negotiations wrap up in the next couple of months. It also shows international support for this fantastically successful and important cause. In terms of nonlethal assistance from the Department of Defense, as I mentioned, there are, overall, 11 projects. I could send you the material on that. But it ranges from IMET to road building; and to this Khmer Rouge program, to medical supplies.

We are now discussing internally and are also in touch with others about possible provision of lethal assistance in terms of what has recently happened, but as I mentioned before, it has to be, in our view, multilateral because we have been in this—holding hands

from the beginning with other countries—very successful undertaking, and it would be a mistake to take off unilaterally. We have to consult with those that we have been in this with.

I agree with your appraisal that there is need; in fact, as I mentioned, the recent military setbacks have shown that there is need to sort of modernize or professionalize the Cambodian Army which, after all, is a part of the Cambodian Government. So that is something we are also talking about with others.

In terms of Sihanouk's health, it remains bad. His doctors have asked him to return to Beijing. He has been undergoing chemotherapy treatment. That is one of the reasons why I understand that within the next few days King Sihanouk will go back to Beijing. I must also add, though, that I think he has been frustrated by the politics in Phnom Penh. We could go into that if you wish, but that might be another reason why he is returning.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, just to note, when I met with Sihanouk—I guess it was a year ago—it seemed to me I had never met a man who was more frustrated by politics than Prince Sihanouk.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Did you ever meet Will Rogers?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sihanouk was not quite as laid back as Will Rogers. But thank you very much.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary, so that I will never ask this question forever more, could you please write a letter to our Chairman on behalf of the administration what is definitely your policy toward Mr. Pol Pot, whether you are going to do anything about this man; and I am sorry, maybe my question wasn't—what exactly, if any, is his involvement with his recent successes that the Khmer Rouge has now taken in Cambodia? Is he involved in any way?

Mr. TOMSEN. Myself, I have not seen his name personally come up in the materials I have read.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. But he is still alive?

Mr. TOMSEN. He is alive, and we assume that he is involved, but I cannot speak to that. Again, we would have to go into a classified setting if we are going to get into this.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. But will you be able to send a letter to our Chairman expressing exactly what the administration's position is on this, so I won't ever have to ask you about this again?

Mr. TOMSEN. Certainly.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.

Could you tell us of any country or organization that might be supplying weapons to the Khmer Rouge besides the weaponry that they capture in the normal course of doing their business?

Mr. TOMSEN. We know—certainly we know of no outside government, Mr. Chairman, that would be doing this. As I mentioned earlier, we continue to be concerned about elements in the Thai military along the border. As the Congressman points out, there is a lot of illicit activity that goes back and forth across the border, so we don't know to what extent, if at all, this is officially even known. It is just a very shadowy world out there.

Mr. ACKERMAN. How do you respond to the notion that perhaps we should be providing the Government of Cambodia with military assistance assets and training?

Mr. TOMSEN. You mean the United States or——

Mr. ACKERMAN. The United States.

Mr. TOMSEN. Well, certainly we would——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Unless you can speak for some other entity.

Mr. TOMSEN. No, but here again the question arises of whether we do it collectively or unilaterally, and certainly collectively——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Should we be doing it collectively?

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes, and certainly in our view there should—excuse me.

Mr. ACKERMAN. With whom should we collect?

Mr. TOMSEN. We are already talking to those whom we have cooperated with in this effort, the peace process in Cambodia on how to bolster this side. In terms——

Mr. ACKERMAN. How are those discussions going?

Mr. TOMSEN. In terms of lethal and nonlethal aid—I want to distinguish between the two—we have not inside our own government made a conclusion on lethal assistance, whether or not——

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have not?

Mr. TOMSEN. Inside our own government made a decision on whether or not it is in U.S. interests to provide lethal assistance.

In terms of nonlethal assistance, like training, other ways to professionalize and modernize the Cambodian Government, those are things that are much more possible, and we are in touch with others about that.

Mr. ACKERMAN. How are those discussions going? Are you hopeful that there will be some cooperation with enough parties to give us cover—I don't know if that is the right word, credence?

Mr. TOMSEN. I would hope so, but it is a dialogue now. There has been no conclusion reached within the U.S. Government on lethal assistance.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Does it indicate that——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, maybe we could convince the Bulgarians to come back. I hear they were a barrel of laughs.

Mr. ACKERMAN. When you say there is no conclusion reached on lethal assistance, does that imply that there is a conclusion reached on nonlethal assistance?

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes. I think we would be ready to discuss with others, the allies and friends we have been involved with on Cambodia from the beginning the provision of nonlethal assistance.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Would we be prepared to go it alone on nonlethal?

Mr. TOMSEN. Well, first, we would like to try the collective approach. If that works, that is the best way. Then I would like to address that question. I think we will succeed in the first round.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Succeed in getting the cooperation of others on the nonlethal?

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. What about the cooperation of others on lethal? Are we engaged in that kind of discussion?

Mr. TOMSEN. That is an element in our discussion with the others, friends and allies we have cooperated with, but there is cer-

tainly no conclusion that has been reached, even within our own government.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, you have been very helpful to us in our deliberations and understanding of the issues, and if there are no other questions by the other members of the committee, let me thank you on behalf of the entire subcommittee and hope to invite you back soon.

Thank you very much.

This hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF PETER TOMSEN

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MAY 11, 1994

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to testify today on Cambodia.

As we approach the first anniversary of the dramatically successful UN-organized elections in Cambodia, held from May 23-28, 1993, the events of recent weeks have demonstrated that the future of democracy in Cambodia cannot be taken for granted. The recapture of Pailin by the Khmer Rouge (KR) and their success in reestablishing illegal control over certain areas in western Cambodia have been setbacks to the Royal Cambodian Government (RCG). While this does not threaten the viability of the RCG, it underscores the danger the Khmer Rouge still poses to Cambodia's emerging democracy.

Despite persistent Khmer Rouge threats, democracy in Cambodia has shown impressive staying power over the past year. Cambodian accomplishments in this area would not have been possible without the contribution of the UN Transitional

Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC was a stunning peacekeeping success. The UN organized the May 1993 elections in which approximately four million Cambodians -- ninety percent of registered voters -- participated. These elections, internationally recognized as free and fair, succeeded despite the fact that the Khmer Rouge, also known as the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), refused to participate, denied the UN access to areas under KR control, and threatened and intimidated potential voters.

Cambodia's Constitution, promulgated September 24, 1993, established a multiparty liberal democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, with the former Prince Sihanouk elevated to King. The FUNCINPEC Party and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), the election's top vote recipients, share power in the Royal Cambodian Government, with which the United States has full diplomatic relations. FUNCINPEC's Prince Ranariddh and the CPP's Hun Sen are First Prime Minister and Second Prime Minister, respectively. The Khmer Rouge, which boycotted the elections, is excluded from the government.

The Royal Cambodian Government has been working to develop governmental institutions, and has made significant strides in advancing respect for human rights, and implementing market-oriented economic reforms. Cooperation between FUNCINPEC and the CPP has surpassed earlier predictions, although there are still tensions within the ruling coalition as these former adversaries work out the dynamics of sharing power.

Cambodia continues to consolidate the impressive gains it has made in the area of human rights. A wide range of internationally recognized human rights are provided for in Cambodia's Constitution. Membership in indigenous human rights organizations has grown rapidly. The newly independent local media have expanded to include radio and television stations operated by political parties as well as numerous print publications. For the first time in decades, there are no political prisoners in Cambodia, except persons detained in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas. Racial violence against ethnic Vietnamese, however, remains a serious human rights problem.

Recent events suggest that as long as the Khmer Rouge insurgency remains active, Cambodia will continue to have

periodic problems with regard to displaced persons. This should not, however, obscure the fact that it was a major milestone in international refugee affairs when just over a year ago -- in April 1993 -- the last of the 370,000 Cambodian refugees in Thailand were able to return to their home country as part of the international effort to bring peace to Cambodia. The UNHCR has recently surveyed the returnee population with respect to their degree of reintegration. Some 80 percent are doing well in the sense that they are no worse (or better) off than other Cambodians. The disruption in their lives, even with their return to Cambodia, must not be minimized; the process of recovery is not a short one.

In the economic area, Cambodia has made important strides, including steps to liberalize trade, improve revenue collection, create macro-economic stability, reduce inflation, and stabilize exchange rates. Cambodia's well-received national rehabilitation and development program outlines sound priorities, including reforming administrative and judicial institutions, promoting economic stabilization and growth, ensuring structural adjustment and sectoral reform, providing direct support for sustained development, and optimizing the sustainable utilization of the natural resource base.

Cambodia is cooperating closely with the International Financial Institutions. On May 6 the IMF Executive Board approved an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) arrangement that should provide approximately $120 million in balance of payments supports to Cambodia from 1994-96. The World Bank intends to extend new structural adjustment lending of approximately $60 million provided agreement is reached with the RCG on a medium-term reform policy. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) operational program envisages $266 million in medium-term (1994-97) lending to Cambodia.

Despite its successes, Cambodia still faces enormous development, humanitarian, and security challenges. Cambodia is one of the world's least developed countries, with a per capita annual GDP of only about $200. Its infrastructure has been devastated, the result of more than twenty years of war and KR atrocities. Cambodia lacks the institutions and adequate numbers of trained personnel needed for a mature democracy. Under these challenging circumstances, it is vital that we in the international community join the Royal Cambodian Government and the Cambodian people in doing all we can to ensure the success of Cambodian democracy.

The Cambodians will not be able to address their problems without sustained assistance from the international community. The March 1994 Tokyo meeting of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) produced total pledges of nearly $500 million in aid for Cambodia this year. Secretary Christopher, heading the U.S. delegation, reaffirmed our commitment to Cambodia, its democratic government, and its nascent market economy. The U.S. ICORC pledge was for over $33 million in assistance for Cambodia in 1994, and an additional $40 million in 1995, subject to Congressional action. This assistance will be used to promote political stability and democratic pluralism, support sustainable economic growth, and meet humanitarian needs.

At the June 1992 Tokyo conference on international assistance to Cambodia, international donors had pledged a total of $880 million for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia, far in excess of the Secretary General's appeal. By the end of 1993 the United States alone had provided more than $135 million in humanitarian and development assistance for Cambodia, meeting our 1992 pledge. This was in addition to the approximately $517 million we had contributed through the United Nations to support the Cambodian peace process.

Our assistance reflects our commitment to demining. The Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC) estimates that there are 8-10 million landmines still in place in Cambodia, roughly one for each Cambodian. Cambodia, along with Afghanistan and Angola, has the highest proportion in the world of amputees relative to population, largely because of landmines. CMAC and NGO's have been very active in the demining effort, and the United States has strongly supported demining in Cambodia. We have already provided $6 million for demining and at the March 1994 ICORC conference the United States pledged an additional $6 million for demining in FY'94-95. A total of $15 million for demining was pledged at ICORC by various governments and organizations.

Another way in which we are supporting the RCG is by assisting the Cambodians in their efforts to integrate their country into the global market economy. We recently sent the RCG a revised draft of a proposed bilateral trade agreement. If the text proves acceptable to the RCG, we should be able to move forward quickly on concluding an agreement. This would be an important step toward restoring MFN for Cambodia, a matter on which we are working closely with Congress. Talks are continuing with the RCG on the unblocking of frozen Cambodian assets in connection with the settlement of outstanding claims involving the two countries.

The question of the hour following the KR recapture of Pailin is what we should be doing to help the RCG deal with the KR threat. Certain steps are already underway. In January we concluded a Foreign Assistance Act Section 505 agreement with the RCG on end-use, security, and retransfer assurances. This is a prerequisite for any security assistance. The agreement includes an RCG commitment that U.S. assistance to Cambodia will not be allowed to benefit the Khmer Rouge.

We have provided humanitarian assistance donations to the RCG to help reintegrate defectors from the Khmer Rouge into Cambodian society. Eight forty-foot containers of humanitarian assistance excess property (HAP-EP) were delivered to Cambodia on April 4, 1994. This was the second delivery in FY'94. Since February, DoD has delivered approximately $900,000 dollars worth of medical supplies and equipment, hand tools, sleeping mats and mosquito nets. We are planning one additional FY'94 delivery which will include medical supplies and engineering equipment. Two deliveries are projected for FY'95.

We have started an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Cambodia. The initial focus is on English language programs, a prerequisite for effective communication between the U.S. military and the RCAF. The $90

thousand in IMET funding will be used to purchase an English-language Lab for Cambodia, train two Cambodians as English-language instructors, and send one Cambodian flag officer to the Senior International Defense Resources Management course. Cambodia has also been approved for Title 10 funding to attend a wide range of U.S. sponsored multinational seminars and conferences. Additional steps in response to Cambodian requests are under consideration.

The RCG and the Cambodian people are striving to consolidate the gains Cambodia has made in building a democratic political system and establishing a market economy. They are doing so under extremely difficult circumstances, particularly in view of the ongoing security danger posed by the Khmer Rouge. The United States has an interest in helping Cambodia emerge as a prosperous and secure trading partner. Each nation in Southeast Asia has an interest in helping Cambodia finally put an end to the violence and instability that have stunted its development. As the first anniversary of Cambodia's rebirth as a democratic nation draws near, it is more important than ever that the U.S. and other countries remain engaged to ensure that the progress the Cambodians and the international community have worked so hard to achieve is sustained.

With their courage and determination, the Cambodian people have moved a long distance from the killing fields of only a few years ago. They have shown that the yearning for freedom is a universal impulse, not a Western export. No other people have suffered more or earned our admiration more. The international community -- and America -- must not let them down.

U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

Statement by Margaret Carpenter
Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East
U.S. Agency for International Development
Before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
May 11, 1994

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss the role of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the international effort to support Cambodia's emerging democracy.

Cambodia's recent transformation is an encouraging success story, and we can be proud of the role that U.S. assistance played. This story has had its difficult chapters, and it is by no means over. Indeed, the political situation remains fragile. But the Cambodians have nevertheless passed some important benchmarks in the last year. Today they offer hope to other peoples burdened with reconstruction and transformation.

One year ago, prospects for democracy in Cambodia seemed shaky at best. The country was beginning to emerge from decades of war, foreign domination, and hardship. The Paris accords of October 1992 had brought four warring factions to the peace table and set out the ambitious goal of creating a multiparty democracy and a free-market economy. But despite the largest United Nations peacekeeping and assistance operation ever assembled, Cambodia's infrastructure and economy were still in shambles. Key generations lacked the training or experience to build new institutions, and democracy and elections were mysterious concepts to Cambodia's largely young, uneducated population. Perhaps most troubling, the Khmer Rouge returned to violence and threatened to disrupt the elections on which the political transformation was to be based.

The elections last May -- the country's first free and fair elections ever -- marked a triumph of ordinary Cambodians who dared to express their desire for a voice in their future. Over 90 percent of eligible voters braved Khmer Rouge threats to cast ballots for a Constituent Assembly. Last summer, the Constituent Assembly wrote and ratified a democratic constitution. In September, Norodom Sihanouk, the new constitutional monarch, returned from exile to inaugurate the Royal Cambodian Government.

The RCG is a fragile coalition of the political and military adversaries that participated in the elections. Political in-fighting continues both within and between the parties in the government. These parties are not well developed as institutions and do not function in predictable ways. All of the factions continue to seek political power and economic gain, and the balance between and among them is under constant negotiation. The unified military, composed of soldiers from all of the factions which participated in the elections, is underpaid (if paid at all) and lacks a traditional military discipline and chain of command. Soldiers frequently leave their posts to earn money to support their families, leaving territory at great risk, as seen recently in the case of Pailin. The Khmer Rouge, both stronger or weaker depending on the observer, continues to fight to regain control of Cambodia and reimpose its philosophies of governance. Corruption is widespread and, combined with the presently extremely low capacity of the government to govern, increases the threat of destabilization. Moreover, Cambodia lacks democratic traditions and its exclusion from the world economy for decades has left a vacuum of experience, institutions and precedent on which the government can establish operations. Finally, the systematic extermination or emigration of virtually all educated Cambodians, coupled with the deliberate destruction of the national education system, leaves an extremely small skill base on which government and private enterprise can operate.

At a donors' conference in March of this year, the new government reaffirmed its commitment to democratic principles and progress toward a market economy. The government also pledged to reform administrative and judicial institutions, promote economic stabilization and growth, support structural adjustment and sectoral reform, and work for

sustainable use of natural resources.

At the same meeting, the World Bank presented its analysis of Cambodia's needs during the period 1994-1996. The Bank's priorities included:

- Demining agricultural land, vaccinating livestock, expanding marine fisheries and aquaculture, and implementing a new forestry code;
- Improving the primary and rural road systems;
- Expanding the electricity supply and reducing energy costs;
- Improving the water supply and rural infrastructure;
- Strengthening public health services, including starting programs on family planning and AIDS prevention; and
- Expanding and improving basic education through better recruitment, training, and pay for teachers.

In response to appeals from the Cambodians and the World Bank, the donor community pledged a total of $773 million for the next two years. This brings the total international effort since 1992 to $1.8 billion. The United States has been one of the most active and important donors in assisting Cambodia's drive for reconstruction and democratization. USAID's program of development assistance to Cambodia is built around four core concerns:

- **Strengthening democratic institutions:** USAID is helping to develop both the public and private institutions that are crucial for the growth of Cambodian democracy. Through The Asia Foundation, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Asian-American Free Labor Institute, and the UN, USAID has provided training for political parties both before and after the May 1993 elections; advice to the Constituent Assembly during the drafting of the new constitution; training of public defenders in the criminal justice system; assistance for the secretariat and the commissions of the new National Assembly; and training of Cambodian non-governmental organizations involved in human rights work.

- **Promoting economic growth:** With USAID help, the Cambodian Government is developing the ability to manage the transition from a centrally-controlled economy to a free-market economy. USAID will provide technical advisers to the government in the areas of macroeconomic planning (including fiscal and monetary policy), management of donor resources, and overall development strategy. With USAID help, the new government has already produced a widely accepted strategy paper on coordination with donors and international organizations. In addition, USAID is supporting faculty training and curriculum design at the Phnom Penh Institute of Economic Science.

- **Building infrastructure:** USAID is helping to demine and repair major roads and highways in Cambodia. During the period of the UN peacekeeping operation, USAID facilitated the UN-supervised return of 360,000 refugees from the Thai-Cambodian border by rebuilding over 500 kilometers of rural roads in the northwestern part of the country. USAID's work stimulated the rural economy and enabled the delivery of basic social services. In the near future USAID will begin the rebuilding of Route 4, which is the national highway connecting Phnom Penh with Cambodia's sole deep-water port, Sihanoukville. Route 4 is key to the entire Cambodian economy, since the only shipping alternative to Sihanoukville is transit along the Mekong River through Vietnam.

- **Improving humanitarian services:** USAID is helping to improve the health and economic welfare of vulnerable groups such as children, orphans, war victims, and widows. USAID is working with over 30 U.S. and Cambodian private voluntary organizations in the areas of community development, health education, primary health care, birth spacing, sanitation, prosthetics, vocational training, and literacy. For example, USAID is supporting World Vision's staff training at the National Pediatric Hospital, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation's prosthetics and wheelchair clinic, and World Relief's community development banks for poor

mothers. USAID also manages a volunteer program that sends young Cambodian-Americans back to their homeland to provide English language instruction as well as technical assistance.

One area of USAID-supported activity that deserves particular note is demining. Land mines, which may number up to 10 million, cause 300 casualties a month and present a serious obstacle to Cambodia's development efforts. The U.S. Government has been the major donor for demining in Cambodia, with total pledges of $12 million since 1992. One of the goals of the U.S. Government's demining assistance is to develop Cambodia's own capacity to conduct this critical work, which will certainly have to continue for years to come.

Given Cambodia's progress over the past few years, USAID's assistance program has evolved from support for humanitarian services and emergency support for the UN-supervised peace process toward assistance for the Cambodian Government's comprehensive national development program. Currently, USAID is developing a medium-term assistance strategy for Cambodia that will guide our work through FY 1997. Recognizing that significant humanitarian needs still challenge the Cambodian Government's capacity and resources, the new strategy focuses on the need to promote political stability and democratic pluralism, support sustainable economic growth, and meet humanitarian needs. Activities designed to meet these goals include:

- Democratic initiatives for better governance (particularly the legal, regulatory, and judicial systems) and stronger political institutions (including political parties and unions);
- Technical and policy support to improve the analytic and policy-making capability of government ministries;
- Repair of 500 kilometers of farm-to-market roads and the road between the deep-water port and the capital;
- Cofinancing of PVO activities (including a follow-on PVO project after the

completion of the existing project).

- Family health and child spacing programs for better reproductive health;
- Training and materials for all 46,000 teachers for the institute of public administration; and
- Environmental planning.

Rebuilding a nation that has seen as much trauma as Cambodia demands persistence, hard work, and often outside help. The Cambodian killing fields have not been miraculously transformed into a democratic utopia. In fact, the Khmer Rouge still present a disturbing threat to the security and development of certain parts of Cambodia. But for most of the population, hope has replaced despair, and the framework for self-governance is in place for the nation as a whole. International support has been crucial in making this transformation possible. Much remains to be done. The donor community must continue to support the Cambodian people in their courageous effort to transcend the tragedy of a painful history.

CAMBODIAN MISSION FOR PEACE
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Supplementary Testimony to the Meeting of the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Conducted on May 11, 1994

May 13, 1994

TO: **MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC**

FROM: **MR. CHIN BUNTHEAN, President of the Board of Directors, Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development, Phnom Penh, Cambodia**

DR. SAM-ANG SAM, Executive Director, Cambodian Network Council, Washington, D.C.

REV. PETER L. POND, Executive Director, Cambodian Mission for Peace, Providence, R.I.

CC: **THE HONORABLE MARGARET CARPENTER, Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East Agency for International Development**

MR. PETER TOMSEN, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

JOINT TESTIMONY

We would like to add the following comments to the record:

We are very grateful for the Subcommittee's focus on Cambodia as well as for the excellent testimony of Mr. Peter Tomsen and the Honorable Margaret Carpenter. We applaud your special interest on increased aid to Cambodia and we support your resolve to bring Pol Pot to justice for his atrocities. In addition we would like to submit our collective opinion that the Khmer Rouge will not be defeated by military means this year, or the next, or on into the future unless:

1) Cambodians are fully implementing the kinds of development proposals stated below;
2) Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge are no longer provided sanctuaries or regrouping areas inside Thailand; and
3) Trafficking gems and timber to benefit the Khmer Rouge is completely discontinued.

In light of our opinion, we ask that the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific urge the necessary appropriation to fully implement Title V, Part D of H.R. 2333, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 94-95, since this is the sense of both the House and Senate, and since this creates a Cambodian genocide commission.

In light of our opinion, we ask for your consideration, support and recommendations on two plans of the Mission for Peace.

- Please consider supporting the community development and leadership infrastructure training strategies of the Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development (CVCD), already in place as a Cambodian NGO, with a Cambodian staff and Board of Directors. CVCD is sorely in need of additional community development training and funding resources.
- Please also consider supporting the development of the Cambodian Peace Institute (CPI). It is our intention that the CPI will also become a Cambodian NGO, to be led by Cambodians, after intensive training by international trainers in mediation, negotiation and nonviolent conflict resolution. His Majesty Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk Varman, King of Cambodia has supported these ideas for over 5 years and most recently communicated to us by saying, "We Cambodians know many ways to fight; sorely we need the skills of peace".

In addition we would also like the Subcommittee to review our attachments which include:

- A description of Mission for Peace programs -- Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development (CVCD) and the Cambodian Peace Institute (CPI).
- Grant proposals that we have submitted to the United States Institute of Peace and to the Asia Foundation for the CPI program.

We are interested in your comments and respectfully request that the Subcommittee and witnesses consider recommending our program for fiscal assistance.

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THE CAMBODIAN MISSION FOR PEACE:
Description of Strategic Program Development
May 10, 1994

MISSION STATEMENT

The purpose of the Cambodian Mission for Peace is to assist in solidifying peace within Cambodia among Cambodians. Since 1979, the Mission for Peace has been at work to bring peace to Cambodia, first on the border of Thailand, then joining every Peace and Reconciliation meeting between the parties at the international peace meetings in Jakarta, Bangkok, Paris, et. al.. At the time, the Mission for Peace was made up largely of Cambodian Buddhist monks led by the Cambodian "Gandhi" Somdech Preah Maha Ghosananda.

The Mission for Peace is currently concentrating its efforts on two programs -- **Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development** and the **Cambodian Peace Institute.** The CVCD program is operating in Cambodia as a Cambodian non-governmental organization (NGO) under the direction of Chin Buntheen, President of the Board of Directors. The CPI program will become a Cambodian NGO with Cambodian trainers in mediation, negotiation and nonviolent conflict resolution.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS

I. Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development

In 1992, a team of Cambodians, including national leaders, Buddhist monks, students, legislators and community leaders were brought together to develop Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development (CVCD) -- a non-governmental community development program to organize community development projects of immediate urgency. To date over 1,000 volunteers (students, graduates and other interested adults) have developed and participated in the following projects:

1. Organizing **street clean-ups**, **blood donation drives**, and **demonstrating for electoral participation.**
2. Developing programs with orphans and street children, including a **Cambodian Big Brother/Sister mentoring program** matching college students with at-risk youth.
3. Providing general assistance to Cambodian NGOs, specifically providing support to **Khemera's women's projects**, programs that promote **human rights awareness and monitoring**, and programs providing **basic education regarding sexually transmitted diseases.**
4. Organizing in several rural communities in Takeo province and Battambang -- working with **rural community cooperatives**, **rice banks**, and managing a **small revolving loan fund** for purchase of cooperative farming equipment.
5. Currently developing a **community computing center** to train and provide ongoing computer access for those involved in local community development projects (i.e. farmer cooperatives, participants in microenterprise projects, etc.).

II. Cambodian Peace Institute

The Cambodian Peace Institute (CPI) will be an independent, non-governmental institution devoted to the promotion of peaceful and multilateral approaches to the resolution of conflict. The CPI will be established to reinforce the learning and the understanding of methods of nonviolent conflict dispute resolution. The CPI will address Cambodia's need for training in nonviolent conflict management and peace through two simultaneous projects:

1. **Grassroots training with Cambodians in nonviolent conflict resolution.**
   This project will initially utilize international trainers in nonviolent conflict resolution and peacebuilding to support and teach CPI staff and other individuals selected by the CPI in methods of **grassroots mediation** in conflict situations. The long-term goal for this project is to evolve into a **training for trainers** -- so that the CPI is sustained in-country by Cambodians.

2. **Roundtable discussions among Cambodia's political leaders to serve the immediate need for consensus building, mediation and conflict resolution.**
   The CPI strategy for the first roundtable is to convene a peace award to His Majesty Norodom Sihanouk Varman, King of Cambodia, inviting all key Cambodian political figures to the awards ceremony. We believe that it would be extremely beneficial for the Cambodian Mission for Peace, or some other more prestigious organization, to convey this award soon -- before His Majesty dies. This meeting would provide an opportunity for Cambodia s key political leaders to convene the first roundtable, with the support of a distinguished international mediator, to pursue a variety of approaches to peace, national reconciliation, and effective mechanisms for conflict resolution.

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June 6, 1994

Strategic Planning for Peace in Cambodia

To: Appropriate and interested Persons in Congress, the State Department and Intelligence Communities

From: Peter Pond

- *Proposed Goal*
  To achieve real peace in Cambodia by the end of 1994.

- *Analysis*
  Cambodia remains at war. No real solution in sight. International interest wanes. What debate there is is discussing potential arms to the royal Cambodian government to fight the Khmer Rouge. It is our opinion that if arms were sent, they would only exacerbate corruption and violence. There's no light at the end of that tunnel.

- *Strategic Planning for Peace by the End of 1994*
  Three distinct possibilities can be woven together. Those possibilities include:

  1. A broad based United Nations resolution.
  2. An effort by the Intelligence community to identify the whereabouts of the Khmer Rouge leadership.
  3. Consideration of action to remove the Khmer Rouge leadership.

- These steps require consultation and support from all sides of the Cambodian leadership, including the King, the Prime Minister and Co-Prime Minister as well as the U.S., France, Australia and ASEAN.

- The UN resolution should have three parts.

  1. Condemnation of the Khmer Rouge genocide including condemnation of the continued military attacks on the Cambodian government and the Khmer Rouge failure to cooperate with the UN elections despite repeated requests from the international community.
  2. The resolution should ask for the end to providing the Khmer Rouge sanctuary, trade, and aid.
  3. The resolution would note efforts of the royal Cambodian government to increase its coherence, discipline and effectiveness and note efforts of the Cambodian government to provide an effective amnesty program for the Khmer Rouge rank and file.

- Note: Necessary additional activities include the creation and support of a Cambodian Peace Institute as a center for training and intervention in mediation, negotiation and nonviolent conflict resolution. The institute would serve issues from the grass roots to the top political leaders.

cc: Mr. Steven Solarz
Mr. Tim Carney
Congressman Robert G. Torrecelli
Mr. Michael Doyle
Dr. Richard Soloman
Congressman Gary Ackerman
Mr. Mort Abramovitz
Mr. David Hawk

Feedback invited
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